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Texas A&M University
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“The conception of justice in periods of political change is extraordinary.” (Teitel,
“Transitional Jurisprudence”)
“The study of transitions can shed light on justice, but the light it sheds will help in
better understanding our common or garden variety of justice, rather than in revealing
something entirely, or even largely new.” (Dyzenhaus, “Judicial Independence”)

Introduction
Over the past four decades a large number of societies around the world have attempted to transition
from an extended period of civil conflict and/or repressive rule to liberal democracy. Afghanistan,
Argentina, Cambodia, Chile, East Germany, El Salvador, Guatemala, Iraq, Northern Ireland, Poland,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and South Africa and are just some of the more prominent examples. These
transitions have occurred with varying degrees of success, and one condition that is widely taken to
affect the success of a transition is the way that a society addresses the characteristic legacy of
wrongdoing from the period of conflict and repression. The scale and nature of wrongdoing during the
pretransition period is often truly horrific, characterized by widespread, systematic, and often brutal
human rights abuses - 800,000 killed in 100 days in the 1994 genocide in Rwanda; 2,000,000 dead during
the four-year reign of Khmer Rouge in Cambodia; 55,000, largely indigenous people, killed during
Guatemala’s civil war; and an estimated 200,000 surviving rape victims in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. Very often a number of unknowns surround such wrongdoing, including the exact number
of victims, the location of the remains of victims, the identities of the perpetrators, and the role of
government in sanctioning or carrying out abuses.
Scholars have coined the term “transitional justice” to refer to the justice involved in transitioning from
conflict or authoritarianism to democracy and, in particular, responding to past wrongdoing in this
1

context. Questions asked in such contexts include: To what extent and in what way should the past be
confronted? Should perpetrators of wrongdoing be punished? Should a policy of lustration, in which
officials from the old regime are barred from assuming public office in the new regime, be adopted? Or
should a community concentrate exclusively on the future, reforming and rebuilding institutions and
relationships? Transitional justice now constitutes a growing interdisciplinary academic field, and
numerous think tanks, such as the International Center for Transitional Justice, take as their mission the
promotion of transitional justice. Examinations of transitional justice are often case specific and
empirical in nature. Indeed, one primary concern in this emerging field is evaluating the effectiveness of
different kinds of legal responses to wrongdoing, such as criminal trials, truth commissions, and
reparations, in promoting reconciliation or ending impunity, and the factors (e.g., the way a transition
was brought about) that influence which kind(s) of response(s) a particular society selects.
In contrast to these empirical studies, my concern in this paper is conceptual and normative in nature.
There is wide consensus in the literature that transitional justice demands that a legacy of wrongdoing
be dealt with in a way that is both effective in consolidating the process of democratization and, at the
same time, morally justifiable. It is very difficult to satisfy both criteria in practice. Very often the
transition to a new regime is fragile; ambiguity surrounds whether a military defeat is decisive, a peace
agreement will hold, or a revolution is permanent. In such contexts granting amnesty for wrongdoing
may be conducive to consolidating a transition, particularly when a military responsible for atrocities
continues to wield extensive power. However, given the especially egregious character and scale of
wrongdoing, the justifiability of granting amnesty to perpetrators of atrocities strikes many as dubious, if
not outright offensive. In the existing literature, attempts to grapple with the tensions involved in
satisfying both dimensions of transitional justice rest on a central assumption, namely, the assumption
that transitional justice is a unique or distinctive kind of justice. That is, transitional justice is presumed
to be distinct from the ordinary kinds of justice found in stable democracies. It is this presupposition
that I examine in this paper.
My primary objective is to identify grounds for claiming that transitional justice is distinctive. Given that
transitional justice concerns the morality of responding to past wrongdoing in transitional contexts,
there are two obvious possibilities for the source of transitional justice’s claim to a unique status. First,
the distinctiveness of transitional justice could be found in the distinctiveness of transitions themselves.
Second, the source of the distinctiveness could be the legacy of wrongdoing in transitions. In this paper
2

I explore the first possibility, that there is something distinctive about transitions which helps to explain
why transitional justice is distinctive. I consider this possibility because it is the one implicit in most
accounts of transitional justice in the literature.
Theorizing about justice generally presupposes the existence of a reasonably just, stable democracy.
This is the context for thinking about what is called “ordinary justice” in the literature on transitional
justice. To establish that transitional justice is a distinctive kind of justice, - i.e., that it is fundamentally
different from and irreducible to ordinary justice - theorists try to demonstrate that there is some aspect
or characteristic that distinguishes transitional contexts from ordinary contexts. In the first section I
identify three different explanations of the distinctiveness of transitional contexts found in the
literature. Transitional contexts are claimed to be distinctive in virtue of (1) characteristic features of
transitions, (2) the moral dilemmas and questions that arise in such contexts, or (3) the standards
appropriate for resolving the dilemmas and moral questions inherent to such periods. In the second
section I consider skeptical arguments that have been advanced against each of these explanations of
the distinctiveness of transitions. In each case the skeptical argument demonstrates that the same
features/dilemmas/standards found in or appropriate for transitional contexts are also found in and
appropriate for the context of stable democracies.
The third and final section offers a novel explanation of the distinctiveness of transitions, one that
concentrates on the distinctive characteristics of transitions themselves and incorporates the central
insight of the skeptics but avoids falling prey to their objections. My central thesis is that two distinct
kinds of uncertainty - existential uncertainty and uncertainty about authority - are paradigmatically
present in transitional contexts but rare in stable consolidated democracies. As such, the presence of
these uncertainties as a fundamental and persistent feature of people’s lives serves to decisively
distinguish transitional from nontransitional contexts.

They provide the basis for an alternative

explanation for the distinctiveness of transitional contexts, an alternative that I hope to show proves to
be more promising and plausible than the ones that have been on offer so far. This account of the
distinctiveness of transitions does not by itself provide a complete account of transitional justice.
Indeed, in this paper I am silent about the substance of what justice demands in terms of how
communities in transition respond to a legacy of wrongdoing. However, as I discuss in the conclusion,
my account of the distinctiveness of transitions provides theoretical resources for understanding why
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the standards of justice articulated in ordinary contexts are not satisfactory as standards of justice in
transitional contexts.
Before turning to the first section it is important to define what I mean by “transitions” or “transitional
contexts.” There is general consensus that a society is in transition during the period in which political
orders are in flux. A transition begins “right after revolution” from an illiberal order or with a cessation
of conflict. While there is consensus that the transition ends when a country has completed the process
of democratization and thus is a “full” or “consolidated” democracy, there is disagreement about the
criteria that mark this transition. Some theorists advocate procedural and institutional criteria, such as
the holding of elections, introduction of constraints on the executive branch, establishment of the rule
of law, and respect for human rights. Others concentrate on the attitudes of citizens and officials
toward the new order, marked by acceptance of the rule of law and liberal democracy, and recognition
of the legitimacy of the new regime. 1 Still others advocate a mix of criteria, such as the presence of
executive constraints, the openness of the media, and the formation of associations “championing civic
causes.” 2
In my view, criteria for full or consolidated democracy should be derived from a conception of the kind
of relationships in which citizens and officials in a democracy stand. 3 The core values such relationships
express are reciprocity and respect for moral agency. Relationships express these values when premised
on mutual respect for the rule of law on the part of citizens and officials, which is required for law to
structure political interaction in practice and for law to define the expectations citizens and officials
have of one another. Citizens must also have the positive freedom or genuine opportunity to participate
in the social, economic, and political life of a community. These opportunities are influenced by both
what a person has (e.g., resources) and what she can do with what she has (e.g., given the social, legal,
and material environment). From this perspective, we can see that the institutional, attitudinal, and
procedural criteria cited above are all relevant and must be met to a certain threshold degree.

For

example, the rule of law is maintained only through the cooperative effort of citizens and officials;
widespread disregard by officials for the requirements of the rule of law renders futile obedience to law
1

Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation,” The Yale Law Journal 106 (7)
(1997): 2009-2080, at p. 2013; David L. Epstein, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn
O’Halloran, “Democratic Transitions,” American Journal of Political Science 50(3) (2006): 551-569.
2
Epstein et al., “Democratic Transitions,” p. 555; Jeffrey Herbst, “Political Liberalization in Africa after Ten Years,”
Comparative Politics 33(3) (2001): 357-375.
3
See Colleen Murphy, A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
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on the part of citizens since such obedience will either be difficult to determine ahead of time given the
character of legal rules or irrelevant to how officials respond to one’s actions. Widespread disregard of
the law by citizens renders the activities of officials futile. Thus acceptance of the rule of law is critical
for the rule of law to exist. The capability of participating in political, economic, and social processes
requires elections that are free and fair, as well as respect for rights.
Importantly, the determination of whether a society is in transition is not always straightforward. There
may be disagreement in particular cases about when an old order ended and the new order began.
Similarly, with a concept like adolescence there may be disagreement about when youth ended or
adulthood began in particular cases. However, despite ambiguity and disagreement about how to
categorize certain moments of a given society there will be specific moments in which it will be clear
that a society was in flux. Similarly, there will be specific moments in which it was clear that a society
was no longer in flux or that an old regime had ended.
I

The distinctiveness of transitional contexts

Most theorists interested in questions of transitional justice simply assume that transitional contexts are
different from ordinary ones. Few have attempted to offer a sustained argument for or analysis of what
exactly that difference amounts to. Ruti Teitel’s work is the seminal and most influential in this regard
and as such forms the focus of my discussion. 4 In this section I distinguish three different explanations
of what makes transitional contexts distinctive. Teitel herself does not distinguish these explanations,
nor has anyone in the literature formulated them as such. My account below reconstructs these
explanations from discussions by and of Teitel.
Possible Explanation #1: Transitions are distinctive in virtue of distinctive characteristics of transitional
contexts.
According to the first kind of explanation, transitions are distinctive because there are characteristics of
transitional contexts that are not found in ordinary contexts. One feature highlighted is the “normative
shift” in “the conception of justice” ordering a community that coincides with a change in political

4

Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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orders. 5

The conception of justice ordering a political community refers to the “the principles

underlying and legitimating the exercise of state power.” 6 During the transitional period - this period of
a normative shift - standards for the legitimate exercise of power by the state are in flux, with past
standards not yet completely repudiated and new standards not yet fully consolidated. By contrast, in
the ordinary context of a stable consolidated democracy there is a stable conception of justice that
legitimates and underlies the exercise of state power.
A different feature emphasized is the radically discontinuous character of the transitional period with
both the old illiberal and the new liberal political orders. The beginning of the transitional period marks
a society’s radical break with an authoritarian regime or period of conflict. At the same time, the end of
the transition is radically discontinuous with what comes immediately after, namely a new political
order and political era marked by the consolidation of distinct institutions.7 By contrast, in the ordinary
context of a stable consolidated democracy there may be changes within the political order, but not
changes in the political order or events that would constitute a radical break from the past.
Possible Explanation #2: Transitions are distinctive in virtue of distinctive moral questions and
dilemmas that are inherent in transitional contexts.
The second explanation of the distinctness of transitional contexts appeals to the distinctive moral
questions and dilemmas “inherent to these extraordinary periods.” 8

A primary source of these

questions and dilemmas is the paradoxical role of law in transitions. In stable democratic contexts the
rule of law is understood to constrain arbitrary government action, in part by requiring stability in the
rules governing conduct and adherence on the part of government officials to such known rules. In
ordinary contexts, in other words, law provides “order and stability.” 9 However, in transitional contexts
law must provide order and at the same time facilitate wholesale transformation. It is because of this
paradoxical role that law must play that certain questions and dilemmas arise.
5

Teitel, ”Transitional Jurisprudence,” p. 2014. There is some variation within transitional contexts. In Teitel’s
words, “Not all transformations exhibit the same degree of ‘normative shift.’ Indeed, one might conceptualize
transitional long transformative continuum in their relation to the predecessor regime and value system varying in
degree from ‘radical’ to ‘conservative’ change” (Transitional Justice, p. 6).
6
Teitel, Transitional Justice, p. 213; Teitel, “Transitional Jurisprudence,” p. 2013.
7
David Dyzenhaus, “Judicial Independence, Transitional Justice, and the Rule of Law,” 10 Otago Law Review 345
(2003): 1-27.
8
Teitel,”Transitional Jurisprudence.”
9
Teitel, Transitional Justice, p. 6.
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One question is whether it is possible, or even desirable, for transitional societies to respect the rule of
law. As noted above, the transitional period is by definition a period of disorder and instability.
Standards for legitimate government action are in flux and changing. Political, legal, and economic
institutions are being transformed. In this context adherence to the rule of law, understood as stability
in the rules governing conduct, becomes difficult if not impossible to achieve insofar as transformation
of the legal order is itself a central aim. 10 Furthermore, even if some degree of continuity with the old
legal order may be possible to maintain, the desirability of such continuity is unclear in transitional
contexts. Such respect seems to entail a restraint on or barrier to the achievement of normative
progress, which the consolidation of a new liberal political order aims to achieve. By contrast, in
ordinary contexts there is no aspiration to achieve wholesale transformation of the legal order; the rule
of law, understood as order and stability in legal rules, is both possible to achieve and desirable to
achieve.
Perhaps the best way to illustrate this point is by considering the dilemma surrounding issues of criminal
justice, which stems from the fact that a key principle of the rule of law prohibits retroactive
punishment. 11 In transitional contexts the actions that are widely taken to be the appropriate subject of
punishment were arguably legal, though clearly immoral, at the time they were committed. Thus
transitional punishment often seems to involve the application of new norms, which the process of
punishment itself helps to construct, retroactively. A prior regime is held accountable according to the
standards of the successor regime. The violation of this tenet of the rule of law in transitional
punishment seems troubling for its own sake, and calls into question the ability of transitional
punishment to be successful in achieving its justifying goal. Punishment in transitional contexts is
typically justified because of the role that punishment can play in the process of democratization. It is
claimed that punishment “undoes” past injustice by delegitimizing the prior political order and
previously sanctioned political violence, while at the same time legitimizing the new political order and
conception of justice. In the process, punishment contributes to the construction of a new conception
of state injustice for their community.

However, to contribute to democratization trials must

presumably be conducted in a way that adheres to standards of legality found in liberal democracies. In
ordinary contexts, by contrast, ex post facto punishment is not necessary. Actions that are legally
10
11

Teitel, ”Transitional Jurisprudence,” p. 2017.
Teitel, Transitional Justice, pp.33-34.
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sanctioned are appropriately the subject of punishment, and the standards that regulated action at the
time a crime was allegedly committed are the same standards used to condemn such actions.
Possible Explanation #3: Transitions are distinctive in virtue of distinctive concepts and standards for
answering moral dilemmas and questions in transitional contexts.
In addition to arguments that claim that transitional contexts are distinct because of their defining
features or their inherent dilemmas, a third kind of explanation can be discerned in the literature.
According to this account, the concepts and standards used to respond to the inherent dilemmas and
questions in transitional contexts are distinct. That is, in this view it is a mistake to apply ordinary moral
intuitions or standards, and indeed our ordinary understanding of certain concepts, to actions in the
context of transitions.
For example, Teitel argues that we need to change our understanding of what ruling by law means in
transitional contexts. Rather than thinking that stability and continuity in law captures the essence of
ruling by law, we should consider the rule of law “as a normative value scheme that is historically and
politically contingent and elaborated in response to past political repression often perpetrated under
the law. “ 12 That is, what it means to rule by law in a given society will depend on the character of the
political injustice that preceded the transition period. 13 To illustrate, in Hungary ruling by law is best
understood as security of individual rights once granted; of particular though not exclusive interest is
the security of property rights. It was necessary for the government, during and after the transition
period, to demonstrate that there would be a domain for individuals that would be protected by the
state, and in which the state would not interfere, even during the economic and legal transitional
period. 14 By contrast, a central source of injustice during the Nazi period was the extent to which
authorities operated outside of law and used legal processes to persecute groups of individuals. Thus
the meaning of the rule of law in that transitional context is best understood as “equal protection in the
administration of justice” and a concern for ensuring that the law was indeed used to administer
justice. 15
12

Teitel, Transitional Justice, 7.
Thus Teitel rejects the usefulness of thinking of the rule of law as an abstract ideal norm (Transitional Justice, p.
7).
14
Teitel, ”Transitional Jurisprudence,” p. 2023.
15
Ibid., 2025.
13
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Similarly, the standards for justice in responding to wrongdoing must be defined relative to the
transitional context. 16 Justice in transitions is ultimately instrumental. A just response to wrongdoing is
one that will promote the transformation of a community into a liberal democratic order. In Teitel’s
words, “legal responses should be evaluated on the basis of their prospects for democracy.” 17
Importantly, justice in transitions is also contextually defined. What counts as transformation in any
given society is contingent on the character of prior injustice, specifically the character of state
sponsored violations of human rights. Thus what counts as successful transformation of the political
order will also be context specific. Third, transitional justice is ultimately pragmatic. Justice requires a
pragmatic resolution to the dilemmas involved in responding to wrongdoing in transitional contexts;
“the idea of justice always a compromise.” 18 Thus in response to the dilemmas involved in criminal
punishment, we might adopt the limited criminal sanction in which prosecution processes do not
automatically result in full punishment. Rather, the establishment and punishment of wrongdoing are
treated separately. By prosecuting wrongdoing, establishing wrongdoing, and ascribing responsibility,
criminal justice is able to separate the predecessor regime from its successor and also condemn
wrongdoing. By avoiding the actual infliction of punishment, however, the limited criminal sanction
avoids ascribing individual responsibility for systematic wrongdoing. Thus “the transitional limited
sanction offers pragmatic resolution of the core dilemma of transition, namely, the problem of
attributing individual responsibility for systematic wrongs perpetrated under prior repressive rule.” 19 By
contrast, in ordinary contexts the standards for justice are taken to represent principled rather than
pragmatic considerations. Furthermore, the demands of justice are characteristically taken to be
noninstrumental, but rather deontological in nature. 20
I have explicated three different accounts of what makes transitional contexts distinctive. One question
that these accounts raise is whether it is necessary for all three kinds of distinctiveness to obtain in
order to demonstrate that the justice that applies in these contexts, transitional justice, is a distinctive
kind of justice.

Consider the first account, that transitional contexts are distinct. That explanation

16

Ibid. and Teitel, Transitional Justice, p. 6.
Teitel, “Transitional Jurisprudence,” p. 2011.
18
Ibid., 2016.
19
Teitel, Transitional Justice, p. 50.
20
There are debates about the exact nature of deontology in discussions about justice and there are
nondeontological standards of justice even in ordinary contexts. However, the above captures a general
understanding of the commonly reviewed wisdom about justice in stable, modern, liberal democracies.
17
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alone does not seem sufficient to show that transitional justice is distinctive, in part because this
explanation does not demonstrate why the distinctive characteristics make a moral difference. To make
the distinctive characteristics of transitional contexts morally relevant, one might show that the distinct
context generates distinctive moral questions or standards for addressing moral questions. In other
words, it seems as if the first account needs to be supplemented with either the second or third account
in order to explain why justice is different in transitional contexts. However, it may be that it is not
necessary for both the second and third accounts to be true. The moral questions or dilemmas that
arise in transitional contexts may not need to be distinct, only that the standards for answering these
questions are different.

Perhaps it is sufficient that the questions and dilemmas that arise are

distinctive. At this point I will not attempt to resolve these questions; rather, I want to turn in the next
section to a different question, namely whether any of the accounts of the distinctiveness of transitions
articulated above are correct and so whether transitional contexts are in fact distinctive in any
important sense.
II

Skeptical challenges

In this section I consider arguments advanced by skeptics of transitional justice. The arguments are
designed to show that the explanations of what makes transitions distinctive considered in the previous
section all fail because they fail to explain anything that is distinctive to transitions. That is, we can find
similar characteristics or questions and dilemmas that we find in transitional contexts in ordinary
contexts. Furthermore, skeptics argue, the standards for justice in ordinary contexts are sufficient for
addressing the moral issues that arise in the contexts of transitions. Below I present the skeptical
challenge, drawing primarily on arguments advanced by legal scholars David Dyzenhaus, Eric Posner and
Adrian Vermeule. 21 After reviewing the skeptical case, I argue that skeptical challenges provide an
important insight that advocates of transitional justice must acknowledge and account for, but that
skeptics have not indisputably shown that transitions are not distinctive.
In the first kind of explanation considered in the previous section, different features of transitional
contexts are claimed to be distinctive to transitions: the normative shift that occurs during transition
and the radically discontinuous nature of the transitional period.
21

However, as critics point out,

Dyzenhaus, “Judicial Independence”; Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, “Transitional Justice as Ordinary
Justice,” Harvard Law Review 117 (2004), 762-825.
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normative shifts are not distinctive to changes in the political order; such shifts also occur in stable
consolidated democracies. 22 Consider the United States. Intrapolitical order normative shifts have
occurred following contestable elections such as the 2000 election, the recognition of new
constitutional rights by the Supreme Court, and important policy shifts such as the Civil Rights Act. In
each case there was a significant change in the conception of justice ordering and enforced by the state.
Thus attempts to base the distinctiveness of transitional contexts on the basis of a normative shift fail.
Nor is it correct, skeptics argue, to view the transitional period as radically discontinuous with the old
and new political order. 23 It is true that substantial changes occur during the transitional period. The
transitional period does differ from the old illiberal order. However, in many respects there is continuity
between the old order and the transitional order.

Whole areas of law can remain unmodified.

Personnel holding roles in the judiciary, legislative, and security forces are often largely identical.
Similarly, there is substantial continuity between the transitional period and the consolidation of the
new political order. Institutions and political processes, such as elections, initiated during the transition
may be continued during the posttransition period. Legal reform achieved during the transition is
maintained following a transition. Many personnel holding office in the transitional period remain once
the transition has ended.
According to the second kind of explanation, transitional contexts are distinctive in virtue of their
distinctive moral questions and dilemmas.

However, critics argue, the dilemmas and questions

supposedly inherent in the transitions also arise in the context of stable democracies. All normative
shifts give rise to similar questions and dilemmas. Consider the dilemma surrounding retroactive
punishment discussed in the previous section. This dilemma arises because in the aftermath of a
normative shift, there is often a general demand that immoral, though legal, actions should be subject
to punishment. One way of framing the general issue such punishment raises is in terms of the
permissibility of sanctioning or censuring past conduct, either by officials or citizens, on the basis of a
different conception of justice than that which defined the contours of permissible conduct at the time
of the conduct itself. This issue arises in stable democracies whenever norms or legal rules undergo
significant change. Politicians may lose elections because of statements they made in the past, which
were sanctioned at the time and reflected the norms of the period. In effect, politicians are being
22
23

Posner and Vermeule, “Transitional Justice.”
Dyzenhaus, “Judicial Independence.”
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sanctioned retroactively in such cases. Judicial nominees may not be appointed because of legal
decisions or commentaries on legal decisions they advanced in a previous era. Justice Rehnquist, for
example, faced considerable resistance to his nomination due to a memo he had written in 1954 while a
clerk for Justice Jackson arguing for the constitutionality of racial segregation. At the time the memo
was written, the correctness of the decision in Brown v The Board of Education was widely contested.
However, by the time of his nomination as Chief Justice in 1986 the decision in Brown v The Board of
Education was taken as settled. To secure his nomination, Rehnquist had to renounce the memo he had
written and state that it did not represent his personal views at the time. 24
The third kind of explanation cites the distinctive standards and concepts that should be used to address
moral questions and dilemmas in transitional contexts. Skeptics argue, however, that it is a mistake to
think we need to revise either our concepts or our ordinary standards of justice in order to resolve the
dilemmas and questions that arise in transitional contexts. Consider the concept of the rule of law. 25 If
we draw on the correct general conception of the rule of law, we avoid the necessity of adopting
multiple, highly contextualized conceptions. Take the conception of the rule of law articulated by legal
scholar Lon Fuller. In Fuller’s view, the rule of law obtains when certain principles that constitute the
inner morality of law are systemically respected. These principles, such as clarity, prospectivity, and
congruence between declared rules and their enforcement, capture the character that legal rules and
their enforcement must have for laws to govern the behavior of citizens and officials in practice. In this
view, law is a collaborative achievement, requiring constant effort on the part of members of the
government and legal profession to maintain the vision of civil society that the ideal of the rule of law
represents. Using this framework, we can identify where the erosion of legality occurred during periods
of repression by identifying, for example, how judges failed to draw attention to the violation of
principles of the rule of law in their rulings and so failed in their capacity as judges, or we can highlight
the extralegal character of the enforcement of laws.

24

Posner and Vermeule, “Transitional Justice,” p. 782. Of course, there are disanalogies between the examples of
sanctioning considered here and those considered in the previous section. In particular, cases of the grudge
informer raise the specter of formal sanctions for past actions, while the case of Judge Rehnquist involves informal
sanctioning, or the prospect of such sanctioning, for past legal views. However, these differences do not detract
from the general moral issue that both kinds of case raise, namely, whether it is permissible to sanction or censure
retroactively.
25
Dyzenhaus, “Judicial Independence.”
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Moreover, concepts of justice from ordinary contexts, including, importantly, the justice of the rule of
law, provide the requisite theoretical resources for evaluating and justifying different responses to
transitional dilemmas and moral questions. Distinctive or separate “transitional justice” standards are
unnecessary. Consider the question of whether it was morally justified for the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to grant amnesty to perpetrators of gross human rights abuses.
Dyzenhaus argues that the best justification that can be offered is in terms of the role that the TRC
played in promoting the justice of the rule of law. The TRC demonstrated the consequences of violating
the rule of law, which systematically occurred during apartheid insofar as equal recognition of all
responsible agents was “grossly distorted.” The TRC also demonstrated that the sense of justice among
South Africans was corrupted insofar as justice was taken to refer to any measure that would serve the
ideology of apartheid. A sense of justice is required, Dyzenhaus argues, “if the transitional government
is to preserve legitimacy and a commitment to the constraints of the rule of law, constraints which make
it possible for citizens to call government to account for injustice.” 26 Through its contributions, the TRC
aided the transformation of South African society from an unjust to a just one, where justice refers to
the kind of order that is valuable and allows societies to make decisions about political issues in a civil
manner. 27
Advocates of transitional justice appeal to or try to devise distinctive standards of justification, skeptics
maintain, partly because they set the bar for a satisfactory justification for transitional responses to
wrongdoing unnecessarily high. 28 Typically, authors assume that in ordinary contexts the demands of
justice are fully satisfied in practice. However, stable consolidated democracies in fact use a range of
tools to respond to normative shifts that are taken to be justified on moral and pragmatic grounds,
despite failing to fully satisfy the demands of justice. For example, governments rarely offer full
restitution following periods in which property is confiscated. Consider Japanese-Americans interned
during World War II. The United States government offered a lump sum of reparations, which was not
taken to fully rectify the property and wages that such Americans had lost. However, the amount was
considered justified, given a concern for protecting a stable system of property rights, which attempts to
return property after a significant passage of time would have destabilized, and a concern for corrective
justice. Tools like such reparations, or even limited lustration, are not taken to be especially morally or
institutionally dubious in democratic contexts; they should not be viewed as prima facie dubious in
26

Ibid., p. 50
Ibid.
28
Posner and Vermeule, ”Transitional Justice.”
27
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transitional contexts either. Indeed, the same justification offered in democratic contexts should suffice
in transitional contexts; such justifications reflect the need to balance liberal commitments against
political precautions in a democracy.
One way of viewing skeptical arguments is as a radical critique of the very idea of transitional justice,
that there is no such thing as “transitional justice” where that term is taken to denote a distinctive kind
of justice. Instead, “transitional justice” simply refers to ordinary justice applied to transitional contexts.
For the purposes of this paper I will bracket the strong skeptical argument, which would stop a
conversation about transitional justice simply by denying that there is any distinctive justice called
transitional justice. Given that my interest is in considering the best explanation of the distinctiveness of
transitions, I assume for the sake of argument that there is a satisfactory answer that can be given to the
radical skeptical critique.
However, I think that there is an important insight in skeptical arguments. Skeptics correctly point out
that the literature on transitional justice makes the case for the distinctiveness of transitional contexts
on the basis of an overly simplistic, sanitized, and idealized understanding of ordinary justice in stable
consolidated democracies. The skeptic shows, convincingly, that things are not nice and clean in stable
democratic contexts. By preventing an overly utopian vision of stable democracies, the skeptical
arguments serve as a useful corrective. They also highlight, for example, that there may be similar
questions and dilemmas that arise in both transitional and nontransitional contexts.
The question that lingers, then, is whether there is something distinctive about transitions and what the
source of that distinctness is. In the next section I argue for a new account of what makes transitions
distinctive. My starting point is the conception of stable democratic societies articulated by the skeptics.
My thesis is that there is indeed something distinctive about the normative shift that occurs in
transitions, which stems from the uncertainty that accompanies normative shifts in transitional contexts
but not in stable democratic contexts.
III

An alternative account of the distinctiveness of transitional contexts

In my view, to understand what makes transitional contexts distinctive we should take as our starting
point the normative shift in the conception of justice that organizes and structures a political community
14

that occurs during transitions. Skeptics correctly note that transitional communities are not distinctive
in experiencing a normative shift. Within a political order, the conception of justice may be modified
after especially momentous policy decisions or constitutional changes.

If we are to distinguish

transitional contexts, it cannot be on the basis of the occurrence of a normative shift; rather, it must be
on the basis of the character of the shift that we find in transitions. I argue below that the key to the
distinct character of the normative shift in transitions is the particular kinds of uncertainties that
accompany a transition from an illiberal to liberal political order, but that do not accompany a shift
within a liberal political order. There are two kinds of uncertainty that are of interest in this context:
what I call “existential uncertainty” and “uncertainty about authority”. I discuss each kind of uncertainty
in turn below.
Part of the reason for the intense interest in transitional justice is that successful and lasting transitions
to a liberal order are not the rule. Studies of civil war and civil conflict reveal an astonishing number of
societies, 43 percent, return to civil conflict within five years of negotiating a peace settlement. 29 During
the “third wave of democratization” eighty-five authoritarian regimes collapsed; only thirty of these
regimes became stable democracies.

30

An increasing percentage of societies constitute “partial

democracies,” from 3.6 percent of 169 countries studied in 1976 to 26.1 percent in 2000. 31 Political
scientists describe transitional societies as “’bouncers’ or ‘cyclers’ that move back and forth between
autocracy and democracy on multiple occasions.” 32 Regional studies confirm the same pattern. Military
coups remain prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa, “despite democratization trends since 1990.”
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“Jean-

Germain Gros goes as far as to argue that ‘there is no country in sub-Saharan Africa today, including
South Africa where democratization cannot be rolled back.” 34 In postcommunist countries in Eastern
Europe and Eurasia, the record includes “a handful of successful transitions and easy consolidations,
several incomplete transitions, a few transitions followed by reversion to authoritarian politics, even
some transitions that never really began at all.” 35 What these figures suggest is that in any given
transitional context there is enormous uncertainty about whether or not a normative shift will in fact
29
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occur.36 That is, in many transitional contexts what the future holds is deeply uncertain. Perhaps there
will be a return to sustained conflict. Perhaps elections will be held. If elections are held, perhaps they
will be credible. Perhaps the results will be respected by all parties to the elections. Perhaps politicians
will act in ways that are significantly different from the actions of politicians past, or perhaps they will
seek to amend the constitution to broaden the powers they enjoy. I call this particular kind of
uncertainty existential uncertainty.
This acute existential uncertainty that accompanies the normative shift in transitions from authoritarian
orders and civil conflict is obscured by the implicitly teleological view that Teitel advances. In Teitel’s
account, transitions are described in a teleological fashion, ordered linearly from an illiberal to a liberal
political order. What is missing is an acknowledgement that the teleological projection is in most cases
profoundly aspirational. The teleological picture of transitions depicted by Teitel reflects the deep hope
that a given transition, and its accompanying normative shift, will be successful. However, it does not
capture the actual political trajectory it is reasonable to expect in any particular case. A shift in the
political order might occur without having the character that advocates of transitional justice desire.
Deep inequalities might persist or be entrenched in new ways in the new political order. Schisms may
develop within communities that were not present before. There is a real risk that peace will not stick
and violence will return. In sum, there is substantial uncertainty surrounding whether the trajectory
presupposed by accounts of transitional justice will be achieved, and if achieved, whether the
attainment of a normative shift narrative will represent a stable and lasting achievement.
By contrast, within a stable consolidated democracy the same kind of existential uncertainty does not
characteristically accompany a normative shift. Normative shifts do not typically pose a threat to the
stability of the political order. While there might be resistance to the enforcement of new rights or to
shifts in policies, characteristically there is no robust threat that a shift will undermine or destabilize a
liberal political order. Consolidated democracies withstand such normative shifts. This fact is reflected
in the stability of full democratic orders in the short and long term. In a study of the stability of
democratic regimes, Epstein et al. found 98.2 percent of democracies remain democratic over a given
year. Over a five-year span only 7 percent of full democracies change, compared to 40 percent of partial
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democracies. 37

One factor that decreased the likelihood of a coup in sub-Saharan Africa was

institutionalized democracy. 38
This is not to suggest that normative shifts are always welcome; they are not, and are often vigorously,
and sometimes violently, resisted. Nor does it suggest that normative shifts will occur immediately or
even that potential normative shifts always occur. However, it is often not a genuinely open question
whether a normative shift that does take place will be enforced. In the United States, for example, it
remains an open question whether the current military policy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” will be
repudiated, and so a normative shift will occur. However, it is not an open question whether, if the
change in official policy occurs, it will be implemented. Indeed, the military has already stated that they
will enforce this change in policy. Indeed, the military is currently preparing for such changes in policy.
Part of the reason why normative shifts in democracies are not accompanied by existential uncertainty
stems from the absence of a second kind of uncertainty that we find in transitional contexts: uncertainty
about authority. That is, there is no stable framework of authority that delimits who has the standing to
resolve the dilemmas and questions to which a normative shift gives rise and what the principles
regulating such authorities are. Specifically, within transitional communities the issue of who gets to
decide how past wrongdoing will be dealt with by the state and the criteria that should guide such
decision makers is frequently contentious.
The primary source of the uncertainty about normative authority stems from the mixed character of
transitional political orders. Transitional societies are by definition periods between authoritarian and
democratic orders; thus their political orders include characteristics of each period. As legal scholar H.
Kwasi Prempeh notes, “Postauthoritarian constitutions may leave in place (i.e., unreformed) certain
aspects of the ancien regime, notably those that have low salience at the moment of transition or that
are not considered among the gravest problems of the immediately preceding regime.” 39 During the
transitional period there is no immediate overhaul of authoritarian institutions and practices. Thus
transitional societies have elements of liberal political orders coexisting with aspects of authoritarian
legacies.

To illustrate, consider the following description of political orders characteristic of
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contemporary sub-Sahara Africa: “It is legitimately hard to characterize the current situation in many
African countries. They are not one party states because parties are allowed…They do not prohibit
elections, even if elections are not always free and fair…while the press is not free, it is not as
constrained by formal and informal censorship as before…it is critical to accept the current fuzzy and
indeterminate condition of many African countries as a (potentially long-lasting) set of regime type.” 40
The coexistence of laws, practices, and institutions from the authoritarian period with reformed laws,
practices, and institutions reflecting the emerging liberal democratic order complicates the question of
authority. It implies that multiple standards of authority may operate at the same time within a
transitional community.

Some standards may derive from the authoritarian past, either as an

authoritarian standard of authority or as authority based on resistance to the authoritarian period;
other standards may derive from democratic reforms.

At times these standards may conflict.

Furthermore, important social, institutional, and moral conditions implicitly presupposed by democratic
standards for authority, and often taken for granted in stable democratic contexts, may be absent in
transitional contexts; their absence can be traced precisely to the legacy of the authoritarian order or
period of conflict.
The following examples illustrate these general features of authority in transitional contexts. The
authority of many politicians in transitional contexts stems from the role that they played in resisting
oppression and repression during the authoritarian period. The authority of office holders in a liberal
democratic order characteristically stems from procedural criteria, such as being elected or appointed
by someone who was duly elected according to specified procedures. However, in transitional contexts
little weight may be given in practice to the fact that such politicians were elected or little attention paid
to the character of such elections. Rather, weight may be placed on their role in enabling a revolution or
change in the political order, and so politicians who lack this kind of authority may not be viewed as
authoritative in virtue of being elected.
Judges often occupy a complicated role during transitions. In democratic contexts the authority of the
office of judges stems in part from their independence from political influence, interference, and/or
manipulation. Judicial authority is also based on judges being appointed or elected in due manner,
40
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according to carefully laid out procedures. However, in transitional contexts the appointment of judges
and their role in the transition itself is often deeply political. New judges are frequently appointed on
the basis of a political role they played prior to a transition in resisting oppression, such as by serving as
human rights lawyers. The many judges who retain their positions following a transition are often seen
as compromised, given their role in the previous regime. In many cases judges from the old order are
perceived as having failed to be independent and rendering verdicts on the basis of what the law
required rather than what political officials desired. In many cases this perception is warranted, and can
undermine the legitimacy that the judicial branch enjoys among a population.
For example, debates about the grounds on which punishment of grudge informers was justified in postNazi Germany appealed to the general view of the judiciary held by the population. The term “grudge
informers” refers to individuals who, during periods of conflict or repression, report personal enemies to
authorities in order to get rid of them. One kind of justification for punishment highlights the way
courts erred in interpreting statutes under which the individual reported by the grudge informer was
charged in an unreasonable manner, given the language of the statutes at issue. This justification also
highlights that it was widely known that the courts based their judgments not on the law, but in
response to administrative pressure to suppress dissenting voices and terrorize the population. This
allowed grudge informers to use the law and flawed courts to rid themselves of enemies. 41 Similarly,
during the TRC, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, chair of the TRC, argued that judges failed as judges by
failing to prevent the law from becoming anything more than a mere instrument or tool in the
implementation of apartheid policy instead of an instrument of justice. Judges failed as judges insofar
as they swore an oath to “administer justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice.” 42
An examination of the challenges facing many judiciaries in sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) highlights the
profound implications that the weakness of judges during an authoritarian period and the lack of
legitimacy of judges within a population have for the possibility of satisfying democratic criteria for
authority. According to Prempeh, during the postcolonial authoritarian period, as in the colonial period,
the judiciary in SSA has characteristically failed to act as a constraint on executive exercise of power,
instead becoming a tool for the implementation and enforcement of government policy.43 In the
postcolonial period the constitution contained limits on government power, but those limits coexisted
41
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with the legal order largely left untouched from the colonial period, which had provisions for the
extensive exercise of power by the executive.

The courts were rendered impotent in enforcing

constitutionally protected rights and limiting the government’s power. This was partly a function of the
fact that the constitution was discredited by political rulers, who grounded their legitimacy in their
ability to satisfy the material needs of the citizens rather than their status as elected officials, and who
viewed the constitution as an impediment to the promotion of the development of their community.
Rulers also dismissed judges who became too active in challenging executive authority. 44 Consequently,
“as far as the majority of Africans were concerned, the courts existed only to enforce the criminal law
against the poor and socially disadvantaged.” 45
During the transitions from authoritarian rule in the 1990s, a central concern became establishing the
formal conditions for judicial independence found in stable democracies, including powers of judicial
review and safeguards from political interference. The problem, Prempeh maintains, is that such
guarantees are not sufficient to ensure that the judiciary will have independence and the authority
based on this independence. For one thing, the postauthoritarian judiciary continues to lack legitimacy
among the general population. “Large sections of the population, however, continue to perceive
Africa’s courts as remote and irrelevant…Add to this the longstanding public perception of the judicial
system as corrupt and biased in favor of the powerful, and the result is an African public that is both
distrustful of judicial power and doubtful of the relevance of courts to the lives of the ordinary citizen.” 46
The sense of the judiciary as manipulatable by politicians, especially given the corruption of the
judiciary, remains. This perception is not unfounded, Prempeh notes. The legislative and executive
branches control the resources required for courts to function. The judiciary remains chronically
underfunded, which creates an incentive for judges to do whatever is necessary to secure the requisite
funding and makes judges more vulnerable to political interference. 47
The lack of legitimacy among the population also undermines the capacity of courts to demonstrate
their independence and to strengthen the constitution and rights that are constitutionally guaranteed.
In fact, there is “chronic under-enforcement of constitutional guarantees in contemporary Africa.” The
sources of this under-enforcement are multiple. The public often lacks awareness of rights guarantees
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and knowledge about the possibility of suing the government to enforce rights. The legislative branches
have done little to reform the laws that remain from the authoritarian period and that were used as a
weapon of repression, due to a widespread sense that it is the role of the courts to declare such laws
unconstitutional when a suit is brought and not the role of the legislature to first overturn such
legislation. As a result, “the existence in a postauthoritarian era of a large stock of repressive legislation
from the past that remains unchallenged in the courts, confronts courts in contemporary Africa with a
paradox of a potentially large supply of justiciable cases, on the one hand, and a substantial deficit of
demand for judicial review, on the other. This shortfall in demand for judicial review cannot persist too
long without reinforcing perceptions of the courts as useless in the face of governmental abuse.” 48
In a context in which competing standards for authority coexist, disputes can arise over who has the
standing to decide how past wrongdoing will be addressed and in what manner. For example, in the
cases of the grudge informer there was deep disagreement about whether the judiciary or legislative
branch was authorized to retroactively declare certain statutes from the Nazi era unconstitutional. 49
Insofar as it is the role of judges to decide how the legacy of wrongdoing will be confronted, there may
be disagreement about the kinds of considerations it is legitimate for judges to take into account. In
other words, it remains an open question who has the standing to decide, and whether, if claimed, that
standing will in fact be recognized and acknowledged by the transitional community.
By contrast, in the context of stable consolidated democracies the sources of uncertainty about
authority do not obtain. Standards for authority derived from a democratic constitutional framework
are well entrenched and without substantial challenge from competing sources of authority. The social
and institutional conditions required for such standards to be satisfied in practice by and large obtain.
Furthermore, there is widespread social acceptance of the authority of branches of government,
including the judiciary. Thus the question of who has the standing to address the questions to which
normative shifts give rise and what constitutes a legitimate exercise of authority are, importantly,
settled. The framework of authority for deciding contested questions and dilemmas is not up for grabs
in the way that it is in transitional contexts. For example, though substantial disagreement exists among
judges, members of the legal community, and ordinary citizens about the principles that should guide
judicial interpretation, few contest the authority of judges to decide what the law is, and so the basic
48
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principle of judicial review. The recognition of this authority is reflected in the fact that judicial decisions
are taken by members of the legal community and the community as a whole as legally binding, even
when individuals may view a particular decision as incorrectly decided.
In this section I have demonstrated that, contrary to skeptical claims, there are in fact two distinctive
features of transitional contexts. Transitional societies are characterized by two kinds of uncertainty
that are not present in the same way in stable democratic societies. The first kind of uncertainty is an
existential uncertainty about whether the transition will lead to democracy and whether any democracy
achieved can be maintained. By contrast, the future trajectory of stable democracies, even in the midst
of a normative shift, is more secure. The second kind of uncertainty found in transitional contexts is an
uncertainty about authority. This arises because of the ambiguous character of the political order of
transitional communities that are characterized by both democratic and authoritarian features. It also
arises because of the absence of important social and institutional conditions required for democratic
standards of authority to be satisfied. By contrast, in stable democracies the standards for authority are
settled, largely accepted, and do not face serious competing alternatives.
Conclusion
This paper has focused on a general presupposition of debates about and discussions of transitional
justice, namely, that transitional justice is distinctive. My objective has been to articulate an account of
what makes transitions themselves distinctive, which does not fall prey to the skeptical objections. The
central claim I have defended is that there are two kinds of uncertainty present in transitional contexts,
which are not present in ordinary contexts.

This account of the distinctiveness of transitions

themselves, I believe, will open new avenues for understanding what justice demands in transitions. I
want to end by pointing out some of the potential ways that my account of the distinctness of
transitional contexts may provide resources for showing that transitional justice is not simply ordinary
justice applied to transitional contexts.
Consider first existential uncertainty.

The presence of such uncertainty may exert an important

influence on our understanding of how the legacy of past wrongdoing should be dealt with, and in what
way. In ordinary contexts, responses to wrongdoing by the state do not have deep ramifications for the
stability of a political order. Thus it seems appropriate to concentrate primarily on what is owed to an
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individual victim and perpetrator when articulating what justice demands. This focus can include a
concern for the social dimensions of the wrong, and the message such wrongdoing communicated to
the broader public. However, typically this societal dimension is relevant for cashing out why it is
important for wrongdoing to be addressed and be addressed by the state. By contrast, given the
presence of existential uncertainty, it seems intuitively plausible that our understanding of what justice
demands in transitional contexts needs to foreground not just the individual victim and perpetrator, but
also the implications and ramifications of different responses for society as a whole. In other words, it
seems plausible to think that the fact that a transition is fragile should have some bearing on what a
justified response to wrongdoing looks like, though it is not exactly clear precisely what this bearing
should be. 50

This societal dimension does not arise when addressing past wrongdoing in stable

democracies because the success and longevity of the political order is not at issue. 51
Furthermore, the absence of a stable framework of authority in transitional contexts means that when
transitional communities respond to wrongdoing they do so in a context in which the kind of legitimacy
that characterizes stable democratic regimes is absent, and indeed trying to be established. Uncertainty
about authority implies that there is no authoritative conception of who has standing to address issues
like past wrongdoing and there are no settled standards for the appropriate exercise of authority, i.e.,
what counts as a legitimate legal or moral reason to respond to wrongdoing in a particular way. This
raises the question: what can count as a source of authority in transitional contexts and standards for
the legitimate exercise of authority?

In transitional contexts the justice of responding to past

wrongdoing requires an articulation of who has the authority to so respond and on what grounds. The
standards or accounts offered for why the state, and who within the state, has the standing to respond
to wrongdoing developed in the context of stable democracies cannot be used for transitional contexts,
given that the democratic framework of authority is precisely what does not obtain.

50

Should, for example, the justifiability of a response be wholly dependent on its contribution to the success of
democratization, or is the contribution to the success of democratization one of multiple considerations to take
into account?
51
Existential uncertainty about authority might also provide criteria for identifying when the circumstances of
transitional justice obtain- ie when it is the case that the question of responding to a legacy of wrongdoing arises.
It may, for example, that there has to be a certain threshold of probability of success for a transition before the
demands of transitional justice by way of responding to a legacy of wrongdoing.
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